aries and capacious, complex identities; and not just cosmopolitan ethics emphasizing the obligations of each to all around the world. They embraced also the notion that the globe could readily be a polis, and humanity at large organized in democratic citizenship. 2 This is an attractive but very elusive ideal.
The discourse of globalization is gloomier early in the first decade of the 20 th century than it was in the 1990s. Stock market bubbles burst, and even recovery has felt insecure; reviving equity prices have not been matched by creation of jobs. The world's one superpower has announced and implemented a doctrine of pre-emptive invasion of those it sees as threatening. Awareness of the global vitality of religion is growing, but intolerant fundamentalists seem to thrive disproportionately. Despite new doctrines of active intervention a host of humanitarian emergencies and local or regional conflicts kill by the tens of thousands and impoverish by the millions. And the dark side of globalization includes diseases from SARS to AIDS and trafficking in women, drugs and guns.
If 1989 symbolized (but only partly caused) the pro-global enthusiasms of the 1990s, 9/11 symbolizes (and also only partly caused) the reversal in mood. Some ask why we didn't see it coming. Focusing on 9/11 encourages the sense that simply a new event or malign movement defines the issue-as though, for example, terrorism were the fundamental underlying issue rather than a tactic made newly attractive by a combination of global organization and communications media on the one hand and local grievances and vulnerabilities on the other. We would do better to ask why we didn't see "it"-the dark side of globalization, or at least its Janus-faced duplicity-already there?
As globalization proceeded after 1989, shocks and enthusiasms alternated. The relative peacefulness of most post-Communist transitions-despite the dispossession and disruption they entailed-brought enthusiasm. Fighting among national groups in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was a shock. There was an enthusiasm for global economic integration and the rapid development of Asian "tigers" and a shock with the currency crisis of 1997. There was an enthusiasm for information technology as the harbinger and vehicle of freer communication and new wealth and a series of shocks with the extent to which the Internet brought pornography and spam, then the dot.com bust, then a range of new surveillance regimes. There was enthusiasm for European integration and repeated shocks when wars erupted in Europe and the European Union could not achieve an effective common defense or foreign policy, and when immigration produced resurgent racism and nationalism. There was enthusiasm for global democracy and shock and disillusionment as war came even to highly touted new democracies like Ethiopia and Eritrea and intertwined political and economic meltdown in Argentina. There was enthusiasm for both human rights and humanitarian intervention and shock when the two came into conflict as the world failed to find an adequate way to address genocide and ethnic war in Central Africa.
Indeed, an explicit attack not only on nationalism but on the state was important to many of the enthusiasts. This was fueled not only by a growing confidence in global civil soci-ety (and potential supports for it, like the Internet). It was also driven by the tragic civil wars and ethnic slaughters of the era. Not only did these offer extreme examples of the evils associated with ethnicity and nationalism, they provided spectacles of possibly avertable tragedies in the face of which self-interested governments refused to act, sometimes citing notions of state sovereignty as rationale. So support grew for "humanitarian" interventions into crises, and also the belief that the crises were evidence of failed states and sovereignty only a distraction. 3 For most of the 1990s, shocks failed to hold back enthusiasm. This was nowhere more evident than in the proliferation of cosmopolitan visions of globalization. These were (and are) internally heterogeneous. All, however, participated in a common contrast to overly strong politics of identity or claims to group solidarity. They extolled human rights and humanitarian interventions by "global society" into local messes. They praised hybridity and multiple, overlapping political memberships. Mostly produced from the political center and soft left, they shared with neoliberalism from the harder right a contempt for states which they understood mainly as authoritarian and dangerous. In this they reflected the libertarian side of 1960s conflicts, New Left disappointments in the welfare state, and a general anti-authoritarianism. 4 They focused not only on multilateral institutions but on the possibility that individuals might emancipate themselves from the sectionalism and restrictions of groups. Whether mainly ethical, political, sociopsychological, or cultural in their orientation, advocates of a more cosmopolitan world rejected nationalism, at least fun-damentalism if not all religion, and most strong claims on behalf of ethnic groups. And so, the cosmopolitans suffered September 11 as an especially severe shock, and the continuing prominence of national security agendas and both religious and ethnic identities as a gloomy regression from what had seemed a clear progress.
To some extent this continues-in speeded up form-a pattern common to the whole modern era. Enthusiasms for transcending old forms of political power have alternated since the Enlightenment-perhaps since the 17 th century-with appeals for solidarity in the face of insecurity and state action to build better societies.
In a pattern of maniacal relapses and recoveries throughout European history, globalism keeps promising to arrive, always seems, in fact, to be just around the corner if not already here, but which continues to find its reality only in an unfulfilled desire against a backdrop of preparations for future war. 5
There is much to feel gloomy about in the contemporary world, including the crisis of multilateral institutions, the prominence of reactionary political groups including but not limited to nationalists, and the assertion of military power as the solution to many of the problems of global inequality and instability. But this chapter is not about the dark side of globalization nor is it a challenge to the cosmopolitan ideal. Rather, it is an attempt to raise some sociological questions about what cosmopolitanism means as a project, rather than an ideal, and how it relates to nationalism. Perhaps most basically, I shall suggest cosmopolitanism and nationalism are mutually constitutive and to oppose them too sharply is misleading. 6 To conceptualize cosmopolitanism as the opposite to nationalism (and ethnicity and other solidarities) is not only a sociological confusion but an obstacle to achieving both greater democracy and better transnational institutions. And I shall suggest there are good reasons why nationalism survives-even though nationalist projects are certainly not all good-and good reasons to doubt whether we are entering a postnational era.
Beyond the Nation-State?
Advocates for a cosmopolitan global order frequently present this as moving beyond the nation-state. Jürgen Habermas, for example, writes of a "post-national constellation," 7 Martin Köhler sees movement from "the national to the cosmopolitan public sphere," with a world developing as a single whole thanks to the social activity and the deliberate will of a population sharing common values and interests, such as human rights, democratic participation, the rule of law and the preservation of the world's ecological heritage. 8 Köhler certainly recognizes that adequate structures of authority are not yet in place on a global scale; he is a moderate cosmopolitan who still sees a role for states. Ulrich Beck is more extreme. He describes a "politics of postnationalism" in which "the cosmopolitan project contradicts and replaces the nation-state project." 9 Many other writers discuss the end of the Westphalian state system-by which they mean mostly an idea about sovereignty and the mutual recognition of states introduced at the end of the Thirty Years War. 10 The Treaty of Westphalia is perhaps a convenient marker for the transition to a global order of nation-states, and the development of an international approach to national sovereignty, but the image of Westphalia is usually evoked in a way that exaggerates the extent to which nation-states were already effective and discrete power-containers in 1648, the basic units of international politics for the next three and a half centuries. In the first place, empires thrived for the next 300 years, though mostly as European projects abroad, not on the Continent of Europe itself. Secondly, the nation-state order was hardly put in place in 1648, even in Europe. It would be more accurate to say that after 1648 nation-state projects increasingly shaped history, both domestically in efforts to bring nation and state into closer relationship and internationally in the organization of both conflict and peace-making. Indeed, the very distinction of domestic from international is a product of these projects; it was minimally conceptualized in 1648 and for a very long time the interplay of nationalism and cosmopolitanism was not at all a simple opposition. 11 The nation-state became relatively clearly formulated and increasingly dominant in Europe and the Americas during the 19 th century. In much of the rest of the world, nationalism flourished more in the 20th century and the project of trying to make states and nations line up plausibly remains very active in the 21 st . Indeed, conflicts in central Asia, the Balkans, Central Africa, and South Asia reveal the extent to which nationalism and the nation-state project are current and not merely historical concerns. Moreover, these are not conflicts of a radically different sort from those that best Europe in the era when modern states were first being consolidated there. Religion, culture, language, kin relations, demagogues, and economic opportunists mixed with the pursuit of political power, defensible borders, and state sovereignty in Europe as well. And Europeans complicated the matter further by pursuing overseas empires even while they consolidated national states at home. France-the paradigmatic nation of most theories of nationalism-was not only forged out of local wars and impositions of state power that unified the hexagon, even in its most revolutionary and nationalist moments it was also imperial. The first French Republic tried to repress Haitian independence just as the Fourth and Fifth Republics tried to repress Algerian independence.
The image of a Westphalian order thus marginalizes empire inappropriately, and deflects attention from the disorder and conflict wrought by attempts to make nationstates the dominant organizational units of sovereignty and monopolies of force. It flattens into legal abstraction an era that saw the world's most destructive wars and the development and recurrence of modern genocide, as well as the creation of a rich range of interstate institutions and agreements. The Peace of Westphalia certainly did not usher in a 350 year reign of peace, though arguably it inaugurated the cycle of philosophical and political declarations of plans for perpetual peace and wars to end all wars. 12 And so it is unclear just what a "post-Westphalian" order signifies. For some, especially those for whom the European continent is the primary referent, it is more or less synonymous with "post-national constellation." And here too there are both domestic and international implications. The first is that cultural commonalities organized and mobi-lized in nationalism underwrote the necessary solidarities of citizens with states through most of the modern era, though now it is in some combination necessary and desirable to move beyond this. What lies beyond may be either solidarities based on the loyalties of citizens to specific political institutions, such as what Habermas has called "constitutional patriotism," or a move beyond particularistic solidarities altogether to some sort of ethical cosmopolitanism in which obligations to humanity as such supersede citizenship, community, and other more local bonds. 13 Secondly, internationally, the implication is simply that states cannot organize global politics or even the affairs once ostensibly contained in their own boundaries well enough to be considered the primary units of global order.
One of the problems with this discussion is that its empirical referents are unclear. Assertions are made like "in the second age of modernity the relationship between the state, business, and a society of citizens must be redefined." 14 Which state (and for that matter what organization of business and society of citizens)? Discussion of whether the state of growing stronger, declining, effective in international relations or for securing domestic welfare is quite frequently carried on without specification as to whether the state in question is, say, the United States of America or Chad. There is also an elision between discussions of a possible global "postnational constellation" or cosmopolitan democracy and debates over the integration of the European Union. The latter may be a model for what a postnational order might look like. Without going into that in any depth, however, it needs to be said (a) that it is not clear how well this is proceeding, and (b) that while European integration might be "post" the specific nation-state projects dominant for the last 300 years, it is not at all clear that it does not involve a new project of much the same kind, rather than fundamentally different. 15 The last is an important point. The European Union is clearly an important innovation in many ways, and it clearly goes beyond anything imagined by the signatories of the Treaty of Westphalia. But one could focus on continuity rather than novelty. One could see the European Union as potentially a further centralization of political power and integration of both state administration and civil society of much the same sort as that which made modern France or Germany out of once less unified and often warring smaller polities. Indeed, Habermas's idea of "constitutional patriotism"-the loyalty of citizens to their political institutions rather than to any pre-existing ethnic nation-is itself a reworking of the idea of civic nationalism. 16 Many discussions of globalization and cosmopolitan governance proceed as though it were obvious that the specific states that have claimed sovereignty in the language of Westphalia define a determinate scale of social organization, as though "nation" must refer to the cultural solidarities and identities organized at the level of those states. But what we see all over the world is that the scale of national projects varies and is hotly contested-precisely because there are no "natural" nations and is no naturally best scale for a state. It was an illusion of Romantic nationalism and the "Springtime of Peoples" in the first half of the 19 th century that there could somehow be an autonomous state for every nation.
A post-Westphalian Europe does not in itself invalidate the projects of sovereignty and self-determination in countries of Asia or Africa. Nor does it necessarily mean in all senses a postnational Europe (though it may mean transcending the limits of existing European nation-states). As David Held says, globalization is best understood as a spatial phenomenon, lying on a continuum with "the local" at one end and "the global" at the other. It denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power. 17 But this "shift" is not neutral. It advantages some and disadvantages others. And that is in fact a crucial reason for the continuing reproduction of nationalism, and a reason why caution is warranted before suggesting that nationalist projects are inherently regressive and cosmopolitan projects progressive. And it is especially problematic to suggest that from a standpoint of apparent academic neutrality that in fact coincides with the centers of current global political and economic power or former colonial power. The liberal state is not neutral. Cosmopolitan civil society is not neutral. Even the English language is not neutral. This doesn't mean that any of the three is bad, only that they are not equally accessible to everyone and do not equally express the interests of everyone.
Transformations in Scale and Struggles for Equity
Globalization doesn't just happen. It is to a large extent imposed. This is misrecognized, though, when globalization is presented as simply the course of history, the mandate of necessity to which individuals and states must adapt or perish. Fortunately, as Kymlicka has noted, "globalization, far from encouraging political apathy, is itself one of the things which seems to mobilize otherwise apathetic people." 18 One of the dominant patterns in modern history is the organization of power and capital on ever larger scales, and with new intensity. This precipitates a race in which popular forces and solidarities are always running behind. It is a race to achieve social integration, to structure the connections among people, and to organize the world. Capital and political power are out in front-sometimes in collusion and sometimes in contention with each other. Workers and ordinary citizens are always in the position of trying to catch up. As they get organized on local levels, capital and power integrate on larger scales.
The formation of modern states was both a matter of expansion, as smaller states gave way in the process of establishing centralized rule over large, contiguous territories, and of intensification, as administrative capacity was increased and intermediate powers weakened. Likewise, the growth of capitalism involved increases in both long distance and local trade, the development of both larger and more effectively administered enterprises, the extension of trade into financial markets and production relations, and the subjection of more and more dimensions of social life to market relations. State formation and capitalism coincided in empires and sometimes imperialism without formal empire. Postcolonies, even where they did constitute more or less integrated nation-states, could seldom achieve the autonomy promised by nationalist ideology precisely because they confronted global capitalist markets and unequal terms of trade.
Certainly there have long been and still are outright rejections of capitalist globalization, including communitarian efforts to defend small islands of self-sufficiency and larger-scale socialist projects of autochthonous development. And there are certainly rejections of governmental power, whether articulately anarchist or simply resistant. But for the most part, popular struggles have demanded neither an end to economic expansion nor the elimination of political power but a much greater fairness in the structure of economy and polity. They have sought, in other words, that integration come with equity and opportunity (the latter commonly of problematically identified with growth). This is the primary concern of trade unions in advanced capitalist countries. It is the primary concern of minority groups in multicultural polities (and nearly all polities are multicultural). And it is the primary concern of people in the world's poorer and less powerful states-if not necessarily of those running the states. Indeed, an important dimension of nationalism is rooted in popular demands for equity. Though cosmopolitan thought often rejects nationalism as some combination of manipulation by the central state, ancient ethnic loyalty, or desire to benefit at the expense of others-all phenomena that are real-it commonly misses the extent to which nationalism not only expresses solidarity or belonging but provides a rhetoric for demanding equity and growth.
The demand that states operate for the benefit of nations comes in part from "below" as ordinary people insist on some level of participation and commonwealth as a condition of treating rulers as legitimate. But the integration of nation-states is an ambivalent step. On the one hand, state power is a force its own right-not least in colonialism but also domestically-and represents a flow of organizing capacity away from local communities. On the other hand, democracy at a national level constitutes the greatest success that ordinary people have had in catching up to capital and power.
Ordinary people in many countries have achieved a modicum of democracy, and a number of other gains, but they did not choose the "race" in which electoral democracy is one of their partial victories. This was for the most part imposed by the development of more centralized states and the integration of capitalist markets. Most ordinary people experienced a loss of collective self-determination before the eventual gains of 19 th and 20 th century democratization. They experienced this loss as the communities and institutions they had created were overrun and undermined by state and market forces. This doesn't mean that workers two generations later were not in many ways materially better off, or that life chances in the advanced industrial countries were not generally better than in those that did not go through similar transformations. It does not mean that many workers would not have preferred the chance to be owners.
It does mean that many of those who lived through the transformations lost-and bitterly resented losing-both what has recently been called "social capital" and the chance to choose ways of life based on their own values and manner of understanding the world. And there are threats of similar loss today if neoliberal ideology leads to both the "extensification" and the "intensification" of market economies and capitalist production without provision of greater equity.
Struggles against colonial rule have often reflected similar issues and paradoxes. Dominated peoples have simultaneously sought to resist foreign rule and to forge nations by drawing disparate "traditional" groups together. 19 A claim to common "traditional" culture underwrites both nationalism and sectional or "communal" resistance to it (each of which is a project of groups placed differently in a larger field, not simply a reflection of pre-existing identity-though never unrelated to ongoing cultural reproduction). Nations appear simultaneously as always already there cultural commonalities, as new projects occasioned by colonialism and independence struggles, and as impositions of certain constructions of the national culture over others identities and cultural projects within the ostensible nation. The situation of struggle against external colonial power makes larger categories of "indigenous" solidarity useful, but the achievement of these is always a redistribution of power and resources-usually away from more or less autonomous local communities, subordinated cultures, and other groups. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu describes one version of this, as true he argues for early 21 st century neoliberal globalization as it was for the French colonization of Algeria:
As I was able to observe in Algeria, the unification of the economic field tends, especially through monetary unification and the generalization of monetary exchanges that follows, to hurl all social agents into an economic game for which they are not equally prepared and equipped, culturally and economically. It tends by the same token to submit them to standards objectively imposed by competition from more efficient productive forces and modes of production, as can readily be seen with small rural producers who are more and more completely torn away from self-sufficiency. In short, unification benefits the dominant. 20 Those who resist such market incursions or the similar centralizations of state power are commonly described as "traditional" by contrast to modern. Their defense of community, craft, religion, and kinship is seen as somehow irrational. It is indeed often backward-looking, though not always and not for this reason incapable of generating social innovation and sometimes truly radical visions of a better society. But to look backward is not inherently irrational-especially when there is no guarantee that the future amounts to progress-or that what some deem progress will advance the values ordinary people hold dearest.
Moreover, the communities and institutions that are defended by those who resist the incursions of expanding and intensifying capitalist markets and state administrations are not simply dead forms inherited from the past. They are social achievements, collectively created often in the face of considerable opposition. They provide some level of capacity for ordinary people to organize their own lives-imperfectly, no doubt, but with potential for improvement and some level of autonomy from outside forces. As Bourdieu remarks, their defense is rendered all the more rational by the extent to which unification benefits the dominant. And as I shall argue here, extremely rapid changes in social organization may especially benefit the dominant, disrupt life more, and reduce chances for social struggle to win compromises and create alternative paths of development.
The same is true, at least potentially, for the project of unifying the working class in order to fight better against more centralized capitalism. The Marxist notion of a progress from local struggles through trade union consciousness to class struggle is an account of "modern" unification in the pursuit of more effective struggle (based, according to the theory, on recognition of true underlying interests in solidarity). But even if unification is necessary to contest impositions of power from "outside" it is not necessarily egalitarian in its "internal" organization. Class unification can only come about if non-class goals and identities are subordinate. Marxists often discuss nationalist or ethnic struggles as though these are merely diversions from the "correct" solidarity necessarily based on class. 21 But all such unifying solidarities-class and nation alike-are achieved in struggle and at the expense of others. This makes them neither artificial nor erroneous, but products of history.
Products of history may nonetheless be constitutive for personal identity, social relationships, and a sense of location in the world. In other words, it is a mistake to leap from the historical character of national and other solidarities to an account of "the invention of tradition" which implies that national traditions are mere artifice and readily swept away.
Among other things, this misrepresents what is at stake in discussion of "tradition." Too often, to be sure, scholars take at face value (and perhaps have their own investments in) traditionalists' accounts of respect for ancient ways of life. But it is equally erroneous to imagine that demonstrating a point of origin sometime more recent that the primordial mists of ancient history debunks national culture. It is not antiquity that defines tradition. Rather, tradition is better grasped as a mode of reproduction of culture and social practices that depends on understandings produced and reproduced in practical experience and interpersonal relations, rather than rendered entirely abstract, as a set of rules or more formal textual communication. So tradition is not simply a set of contents, but a mode of reproduction of such contents. It works for people when it successfully organizes projects in their lives.
As a kind of ubiquitous involvement in culture, often incorporated prereflectively as habitus, tradition works best where change is gradual so that there can be continual adaptation embedded in the ordinary processes of reproduction. But it is misleading to approach "tradition" as the opposite of progress, as referring to simple continuity of the past, or as simple backwardness. Tradition is partly backward looking, a project of preserving and passing on wisdom and right action. But as a project, it is also forward looking. Traditions must be reconstructed-sometimes purified and sometimes enhanced-whether this is explicitly announced or not. Moderns have tended to look on changes to a story or a statement of values as necessarily falling into three categories: deceptions, errors, or clearly announced revisions. But in fact the constant revision of living traditions works differently. It is not as though there is simply a "true" or authoritative version at time one, against which the "changes" are to be judged. Rather, the tradition is always in the process of production and reproduction simultaneously. Usually the latter predominates enormously over the former-and thus there is continuity from the past. But this is achieved not merely by reverence but by action. People put the culture they have absorbed (or that has been inculcated into them) to work every time they take an action. But they also adapt it, mobilize the parts of it that fit the occasion and indeed their strategy. They do this commonly without any conscious decision and certainly without the intent of acting on the tradition. Put another way, tradition is medium and condition of their action, not its object, even though their actions will (collectively and cumulatively) have implications for tradition. Language is a good example, as people use it to accomplish innumerable ends, and shape it through the ways in which they use it, but only very exceptionally through an intention to do so.
It is misleading, thus, to equate tradition simply with antiquity of cultural contents. Max Weber is often cited for such a view, but this is am incomplete reading. Like most thinkers since the Enlightenment, Weber opposed mere unconscious reflex or unexamined inheritance to rationality as conscious and sensible action. He saw traditional action as "determined by ingrained habituation," and thought that it lay very close to the borderline of what could be called meaningfully oriented action. 22 I would suggest that we see this account as a forerunner-albeit problematic and lim-ited-of Bourdieu's deeper development of the idea of habitus. The latter reaches beyond mere habituation and is less deterministic. Above all, it situates action in a field of social relations, not as the decontextualized expression or choice or even interaction of individuals. 23 Bourdieu reveals habitus to matter more in modern societies than Weber thought traditional action did; indeed, in important ways Bourdieu deconstructs the opposition of traditional to modern, showing for example how much reproduction there is within ostensibly progressive modernity. The crucial point, however, is that Weber approached tradition through its medium of reproduction-ingrained habituation. He may have grasped that too narrowly, but the approach was sound. What Weber defined by its backward-looking character was not so much tradition as traditionalism. This was what Weber described as "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed." 24 Here too there is an echo in Bourdieu, who in his studies of colonial Algeria made much of the difference between "traditional" Berber society, which he was obliged as much to reconstruct as he was able to observe it in his fieldwork in Kabylia, and the traditionalism that was deployed by various indigenous interpreters of Berber culture in the context of rapid social change and destabilization of old ways of life. Both in the countryside and among labor-migrants to Algerian cities, Bourdieu observed self-declared cultural leaders who proffered their accounts of true and ancient traditions. But these accounts were already codifications-whether formally written down or not-at least one step removed from the ubiquitous reproduction of social life and culture in constant interaction. 25 We could think of traditionalism as the mobilization of specific contents of older culture as valuable in themselves, even if now disconnected from their previous modes of reproduction and ways of life.
This excursus on tradition is important because cosmopolitans are apt to see traditional culture as a set of contents, possibly erroneous, rather than a basic underpinning for many people's practical orientation to the world. They are apt to approach it with an eye to sorting its good from its bad elements-keep that folk art perhaps but lose that patriarchy. They are apt to regard it as a kind of possession, a good to which people have a right so long as it doesn't conflict with other more basic goods. This not only misses the extent to which culture is constitutive. 26 It also misses the extent to which rapid social change is not merely disorienting but disempowering. And finally, it misses the extent to which roots in traditional culture and communal social relations are basic to the capacity for collective resistance to inequitable social change-like that brought by global capitalism and perhaps exacerbated by some of the ways in the United States uses its state power. Last but not least, absorbing the typical modern orientation to tradition as simply backward looking leads many cosmopolitans to miss the extent to which new forward looking projects are built-perhaps "grown" would be a better word-on traditional roots. I refer both to the extent to which self-conscious projects for a better society draw on themes in traditional culture-seeking not simply to resist change but to achieve in new ways things traditionally thought good-and to the extent to which even without self-conscious projects tradition offers a medium for bringing diverse people together in common culture. Indeed, much of the actually existing cosmopolitan bridging of ethnic boundaries depends not on abstract universalism but on the commingling of older traditions and the production of new ones in informal relationships and local contexts.
Both roots and the need for roots are asymmetrically distributed. It is often precisely those lacking wealth, elite connections, and ease of movement who find their membership in solidaristic social groups most important as an asset. This is so whether the groups are communities, crafts, ethnicities, nations, or religions. Different groups of people struggle both to maintain some realms of autonomy and to gain some voice in (if not control over) the processes of larger scale integration. The idea that there are clearly progressive and clearly reactionary positions in these struggles is misleading. So is the idea that there is a neutral position offering a cosmopolitan view that is not itself produced in part through tradition.
Philosophers have long proposed both ideal social orders and ethical precepts for individual action based on the assumption that individuals could helpfully be abstracted from their concrete social contexts, at least for the purposes of theory. The motivations for such arguments have been honorable: that existing social contexts endow much that is both evil and mutable with the force and justification of apparent necessity, and that any starting point for understanding persons other than their radical equality in essential humanness and freedom opens the door to treating people as fundamentally unequal. Such theories, grounded in the abstract universality of individual human persons, may provide insights. They are, however, fundamentally unsound as guides to the world in which human beings must take actions. They lead not only to a tyranny of the abstract ought over real moral possibilities, and to deep misunderstandings of both human life and social inequality, but also to political programs which, however benign and egalitarian their intentions, tend to reproduce problematic power relations.
Among the instances of these problems is the overeager expectation that the world could happily be remade through ethical, political, socio-psychological, and cultural orientations in which individual freedom and appropriations of the larger world would require no strong commitment to intervening solidarities. This reveals a certain blindness in cosmopolitan theory, blindness toward the sociological conditions for cosmopolitanism itself and toward the reasons why national, ethnic, and other groups remain important to most of the world's people. It is about the ways in which cosmopolitanism-however attractive in some ways-is compromised by its formulation in liberal individualist terms that block appreciation of the importance of social solidarity. Nussbaum, for example, discerns two opposing traditions in thinking about political community and the good citizen. "One is based upon the emotions; the other urges their removal." 27 While each in its own way pursues freedom and equality, the first relies too much on compassion for her taste.
The former aims at equal support for basic needs and hopes through this to promote equal opportunities for free choice and self-realization; the other starts from the fact of internal free-dom-a fact that no misfortune can remove-and finds in this fact a source of political equality.
But surely this is a false opposition. Instead of adjudicating between the two sides in this debate, perhaps we should ask how to escape from it.
The Social Bases of Cosmopolitanism
"To belong or not to belong," asks Ulrich Beck, "that is the cosmopolitan question." 28 Indeed perhaps it is, but if so, one of the most crucial things it reveals about cosmopolitanism is that some people are empowered to ask the question with much more freedom and confidence than others. Another is the extent to which cosmopolitanism is conceptualized as the absence of particularism rather than a positive form of belonging.
Oddly, Beck asks the question in a paper devoted to "the analysis of global inequality." His agenda is to focus our attention on the "big inequalities" between rich and poor nations. These, he suggests, dwarf inequalities within nations. There is much to this, though it oversimplifies empirical patterns of inequality. Beck is certainly right that It is surprising how the big inequalities which are suffered by humanity can be continuously legitimized through a silent complicity between the state authority and the state-obsessed social sciences by means of a form of organized non-perception. 29 But what he doesn't consider is the extent to which participation in a superficially multinational cosmopolitan elite is basic to the reproduction of that non-perception. The elites of "poor" countries who participate in global civil society, multilateral agencies, and transnational business corporations not only make money their compatriots can barely imagine but make possible the cosmopolitan illusion of elites from rich countries. This is the illusion that their relationships with fellow cosmopolitans truly transcend nation and culture and place. Cosmopolitan elites too often misrecognize transnational class formation as the escape from belonging.
Elsewhere, I have analyzed the "class consciousness of frequent travelers" that underwrites this misrecognition. 30 I mean to call attention not just to the elite occupational status of those who form the archetypal image of the cosmopolitans, but to the grounding certain material privileges give to the intellectual position. "Good" passports and easy access to visa, international credit cards and membership in airline clubs, invitations from conference organizers and organizational contacts all facilitate a kind of inhabitation (if not necessarily citizenship) of the world as an apparent whole. To be sure, diasporas provide for other circuits of international connectivity, drawing on ethnic and kin connections rather than the more bureaucratically formalized ones of businesspeople, academics, and aid workers. But though these are real, they face significantly different contextual pressures.
Post 9/11 restrictions on visas-let alone immigration-reveal the differences between those bearing European and American passports and most others in the world. The former hardly notice the change and mover nearly freely as before. The latter find their international mobility sharply impeded and sometimes blocked. Or else they find it to be forced-as for example thousands who have made lives and put down roots in America are deported each year, sometimes, especially children born in the US, to "homes" they barely know or even have never inhabited. European intellectuals like Georgi Agamben might cancel lecture engagements to protest the exercise of "biopower" by a US administration eager to print, scan, and type any visitor. But his cosmopolitan challenge to a regrettable national regime-however legitimate-is altogether different from the unchosen circumstances of those who migrated to make a better life, did so, and had it snatched from them. 31 The global border control regime thus encourages a sense of natural cosmopolitanism for some and reminds others of their nationality (and often of religion and ethnicity as well). However cosmopolitan their initial intentions or selfunderstandings, these Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans are reminded by the ascriptions and restrictions with which they are confronted that at least certain sorts of cosmopolitanism are not for them. Normative cosmopolitans can (and do) assert that this is not the way the world should be, and that borders should be more open. But they need also to take care not to deny the legitimacy of any anti-cosmopolitan responses people may have to this regime of borders, including not just resentment but renewed identification with nations and even projects of national development which hold out the prospect of enabling them to join the ranks of those with good passports.
The point is not simply privilege. It is that a sense of connection to the world as a whole, and of being a compe-tent actor on the scale of "global citizenship" is not merely a matter of the absence of more local ties. It has its own material and social conditions. Moreover, the cosmopolitan elites are hardly culture-free; they do not simply reflect the rational obligations of humanity in the abstract (even if their theories try to).
To some extent, the cosmopolitan elite culture is a product of Western dominance and the kinds of intellectual orientations it has produced. It reflects "modernity" which has its own historical provenance.
This revenant late liberalism reveals, in a more exaggerated form, a struggle at the heart of liberal theory, where a genuine desire for equality as a universal norm is tethered to a tenacious ethnocentric provincialism in matters of cultural judgment and recognition. 32 But the cultural particularity is not simply inheritance, and not simply a reflection of (mainly) Western modernity. It is also constructed out of the concrete conditions of cosmopolitan mobility, education, and participation in certain versions of news and other media flows. It is the culture of those who attend Harvard and the LSE, who read The Economist and Le Monde, who recognize Mozart's music as universal, and who can discuss the relative merits of Australian, French, and Chilean wines. It is also a culture in which secularism seems natural and religion odd, and in which respect for human rights is assumed but the notion of fundamental economic redistribution is radical and controversial. This culture has many good qualities, as well as blindspots, but nonetheless it is culture and not its absence.
Martha Nussbaum and some other "extreme" cosmopolitans, present cosmopolitanism first and foremost as a kind of virtuous deracination, a liberation from the possibly illegitimate and in any case blinkering attachments of locality, ethnicity, religion, and nationality. 33 But like secularism, cosmopolitanism is a presence not an absence, an occupation of particular positions in the world, not a view from nowhere or everywhere. All actually existing cosmopolitanisms, to be more precise, reflect influences of social location and cultural tradition. The ways in which any one opens to understanding or valuing of others are specific and never exhaust all the possible ways. Secularism is again instructive. The parameters of specific religious traditions shape the contours of what is considered not religious, nor not the domain of specific religions. The not-specificallyreligious, thus, is never a simple embodiment of neutrality. What is "secular" in relation to multiple Christian denominations may not be exactly equivalent to what is secular in the context of Hindu or Muslim traditions (let alone of their intermingling and competition). So too, cosmopolitan transcendence of localism and parochialism is not well understood as simple neutrality towards or tolerance of all particularisms. It is participation in a particular, if potentially broad, process of cultural production and social interconnection that spans boundaries.
To say that the cosmopolitanism of most theories reflects the experience of business, academic, government, and civil society elites, thus, is not merely to point to some reasons why others may not so readily share it but also to suggest sources of its particular character. It is a neither freedom from culture nor a matter of pure individual choice, but a cultural position constructed on particular social bases and a choice made possible by both that culture and those bases. It is accordingly different from the transcendence of localism on other cultural and social bases. Cosmopolitanism has particular rather than solely universal content, thus, so its advocates sometimes fail to recognize this. Moreover, the content and the misrecognition are connected to social bases of relative privilege.
Much thinking about ethnicity and the legitimacy of local or other particularistic attachments by self-declared cosmopolitans reflects their tacit presumption of their own more or less elite position. I do not mean simply that they act to benefit themselves, or in other ways from bad motives. Rather, I mean that their construction of genuine benevolence is prejudiced against ethnic and other attachments because of the primacy of the perspective of elites. Any prejudice by elites in favor of others in their own ethnic groups or communities would amount to favoring the already privileged (a very anti-Rawlsian position). So the cosmopolitans are keen to rule out such self-benefiting particularism. But ethnic solidarity is not always a matter of exclusion by the powerful; it is often a resource for effective collective action and mutual support among the less powerful. While it is true, in other words, that in-group solidarity by those in positions of power and influence usually amounts to discrimination against less powerful or privileged others, it is also true that solidarity serves to strengthen the weak. Indeed, those who are excluded from or allowed only weak access to dominant structures of power and discourse have especially great need to band together in order to be effective. Of course, elites also band together to protect privilege (and as Weber emphasized, exclusivity is a prominent elite weapon against the inclusive strategies of mass activists). 34 And elites manipulate solidarities to pursue their own advantages rather than considering equally the interests of all. Nonetheless, elites are typically empowered as individuals in ways non-elites are not.
In short, when cosmopolitan appeals to humanity as a whole are presented in individualistic terms, they are apt to privilege those with the most capacity to get what they want by individual action. However well intentioned, they typically devalue the ways in which other people depend on ethnic, national, and communal solidarities-among others-to solve practical problems in their lives. And they typically neglect the extent to which asserting that cultural difference should be valued only as a matter of individual taste undermines any attempt to redistribute benefits in the social order across culturally defined groups. They can extol multiculturalism, in other words, so long as this is defined as a harmonious arrangement in all cultures are seen as attractive parts of a mosaic, but not when members of one cultural group organize to demand that the mosaic be altered. 35 Cosmopolitanism, Liberalism, and Belonging 36 As political theory, cosmopolitanism responds crucially to the focus of traditional liberalism on the relationship of individual persons to individual states (and sometimes to markets). Ideas of citizenship and rights both reflect the attempt to construct the proper relationship between liberal subjects and sovereign states. The cosmopolitan theorists of the 1990s recognized problems both in how this constituted international relations as relations among such states, neglecting the many other ways in which individuals participated in a transnational or indeed nonnationally trans-state activities, and in the difficulty of accounting for why specific populations of individuals belonged in specific states.
Earlier liberals had often relied at least tacitly on the idea of "nation" to give an account of why particular people belong together as the "people" of a particular state. So long as the fiction of a perfect match between nations and states was plausible, this was relatively unproblematic, though it meant liberal theory was sociologically impoverished. To their credit, the various theorists of a new cosmopolitan liberalism recognized that it was no longer tenable to rely so uncritically on the idea of nation.
The prioritization of the individual society came to seem increasingly untenable. It began to seem fundamental and not contingent that markets and other social relations extend across nation-state borders, that migration and cultural flows challenge nationalist notions of the integral character of cultures and political communities, that states are not able to organize or control many of the main influences on the lives of their citizens, and that the most salient inequalities are intersocietally global and thus not addressed by intrasocietal measures. Accordingly, an important project for liberals was to work out how to extend their theories of justice and political legitimacy to a global scale.
A cosmopolitan attitude appeared both as a timeless good and as a specific response to current historical circumstances. The extension of markets, media, and migration has, advocates of a new cosmopolitan liberalism argue, reduced both the efficacy of states and the adequacy of moral and political analysis that approaches one "society" at a time. At the same time, "identity politics" and multiculturalism have in the eyes of many liberals been excessive and become sources of domestic divisions and illiberal appeals to special rights for different groups. Accordingly, cosmopolitan theorists argue that the "first principles" of ethical obligation and political community should stress the allegiance of each to all at the scale of humanity.
The new cosmopolitans retain, however, one of the weaknesses of older forms of liberalism. They offer no strong account of social solidarity or of the role of culture in constituting human life. For the most part, they start theorizing from putatively autonomous, discrete, and cultureless individuals. Reliance on the assumption that nations were naturally given pre-political bases for states had helped older liberals to paper over the difficulty of explaining why the individuals of their theories belonged in particular states (or conversely could rightly be excluded from them). The new cosmopolitanism is generally antinationalist, seeing nations as part of the fading order of political life divided on lines of states. Its advocates rightly refuse to rely on this tacit nationalism. But as they offer no new account of solidarity save the obligations of each human being to all others, they give little weight to "belonging," to the notion that social relationships might be as basic as individuals, or that individuals exist only in cultural milieux-even if usually in several at the same time.
Indeed, much of the new liberal cosmopolitan thought proceeds as though belonging is a matter of social con-straints from which individuals ideally ought to escape, or temptations to favoritism they ought to resist. Claims of special loyalty or responsibility to nations, communities, or ethnic groups, thus, are subordinated or fall under suspicion of illegitimacy. To claim that one's self-definition, even one's specific version of loyalty to humanity, comes through membership of some such more particular solidarity is, in Martha Nussbaum's words, a "morally questionable move of self-definition by a morally irrelevant characteristic." 37 The individualism the new cosmopolitanism inherits from earlier liberalism is attractive partly because of its emphasis on freedom, which encourages suspicion of arguments in favor of ethnicity, communities, or nations. These, many suggest, can be legitimate only as the choices of free individuals-and to the extent they are inherited rather than chosen they should be scrutinized carefully, denied any privileged standing, and possibly rejected. 38 Nonetheless, it is impossible not to belong to social groups, relations, or culture. The idea of individuals abstract enough to be able to choose all their "identifications" is deeply misleading. Versions of this idea are, however, widespread in liberal cosmopolitanism. They reflect the attractive illusion of escaping from social determinations into a realm of greater freedom, and from cultural particularity into greater universalism. But they are remarkably unrealistic, and so abstract as to provide little purchase on what the next steps of actual social action might be for real people who are necessarily situated in particular webs of belonging, with access to particular others but not to humanity in general. Treating ethnicity as essentially (rather than partially) a choice of identifications, they neglect the omnipresence of ascription (and discrimination) as determinations of social identities. And they neglect the extent to which people are implicated in social actions which they are not entirely free to choose (as, for example, I remain an American and share responsibility for the invasion of Iraq despite my opposition to it and distaste for the current US administration). Whether blame or benefit follow from such implications, they are not altogether optional.
Efforts to transcend the limits of belonging to specific webs of relationships do not involve freedom from social determinations, but transformations of social organization and relationships. Sometimes transcendence of particular solidarities involves no neat larger whole but a patchwork quilt of new connections, like those mediated historically by trading cities and still today by diasporas. But transcending local solidarities has also been paradigmatically how the growth of nationalism has proceeded, sometimes complementing but often transforming or marginalizing more local or sectional solidarities (village, province, caste, class, or tribe). Nations usually work by presenting more encompassing identities into which various sectional ones can fit. And in this it is crucial to recognize that nations have much the same relationship to pan-national or global governance projects that localities and minorities had to the growth of national states.
Will Kymlicka has argued that it is important "to view minority rights, not as a deviation from ethnocultural neutrality, but as a response to majority nation-building." 39 In the same sense, I have suggested that it is a mistake to treat nationalism as a deviation from cosmopolitan neutrality. In the first place, cosmopolitanism is not neutral-though cosmopolitans can try to make both global institutions and global discourse more open and more fair. In the second place, national projects respond to global projects. They are not mere inheritances from the past, but ways-certainly very often problematic ways-of taking hold of current predicaments.
The analogy between nations faced with globalization and minorities within nation-states-both immigrants and so-called national minorities-is strong. And we can learn from Kymlicka's injunction "Fairness therefore requires an ongoing, systematic exploration of our common institutions to see whether their rules, structures and symbols disadvantage immigrants." 40 Cosmopolitanism at its best is a fight for just such fairness in the continued development of global institutions. But the analogy is not perfect, and is not perfect precisely because most immigrants (and national minorities) make only modest claims to sovereignty. Strong Westphalian doctrines of sovereignty may always have been problematic and may now be out of date. But just as it would be hasty to imagine we are embarking on a postnational era-when all the empirical indicators are that nationalism is resurgent precisely because of asymmetrical globalization-so it would be hasty to forget the strong claims to collective autonomy and self-determination of those who have been denied both, and the need for solidarity among those who are least empowered to realize their projects as individuals. Solidarity need not always be national, and need not always develop from traditional roots. But for many of those treated most unfairly in the world, nations and traditions are potentially important resources.
Conclusion
I have argued that there are good reasons to think we are not entering very abruptly into a postnational era. It is not at all clear, for example, that the European Union is a "postnational" project rather than a continuation of the same trend that produced national unification in France and Germany and subordinated Scottish, Irish, Welsh and indeed English identities in the British state. Nor is it clear that the projects of broadening and deepening national solidarities and trying to join them to popular states are without value for people in most of the world's developing-or undeveloping-countries.
Fairness in global integration is not just a matter of achieving the "best" abstract design of global institutions. It necessarily also includes allowing people inhabiting diverse locations in the world, diverse traditions, and diverse social relationships opportunities to choose the institutions in and through which they will integrate. I have suggested that most cosmopolitan theories are individualistic in ways that obscure the basic importance of social relationships and culture. I have defended tradition, thus, and urged thinking of it as a mode of reproduction of culture and practical orientations to action, not as a bundle of contents. On this basis I have suggested that when globalization causes abrupt social transformations it is typically disempowering, but that tradition importantly underpins popular resistance to asymmetrical globalization. Projects grounded in tradition can be forward-looking; they are not always captured by demagogic traditionalists extolling stasis or a return to some idealized past.
No one lives outside particularistic solidarities. Some cosmopolitan theorists may believe they do, but this is an illusion made possible by positions of relative privilege and the dominant place of some cultural orientations in the world at large. The illusion is not a simple mistake, but a misrecognition tied to what Pierre Bourdieu called the "illusio" of all social games, the commitment to their structure that shapes the engagement of every player and makes possible effective play. 41 In other words, cosmopolitans do not simply fail to see the cultural particularity and social supports of their cosmopolitanism, but cannot fully and accurately recognize these without introducing a tension between themselves and their social world. And here I would include myself and probably all of us. Whether we theorize cosmopolitanism or not, we are embedded in social fields and practical projects in which we have little choice but to make use of some of the notions basic to cosmopolitanism and thereby reproduce it. We have the option of being self-critical as we do so, but not of entirely abandoning cosmopolitanism because we cannot act effectively without it. Nor should we want to abandon it, since it enshrines many important ideas like the equal worth of all human beings and-at least potentially-the value of cultural and social diversity. But we should want to transform it, not least because as usually constructed, especially in its most individu-alistic forms, it systematically inhibits attention to the range of solidarities on which people depend, and to the special role of such solidarities in the struggles of the less privileged and those displaced or challenged by capitalist globalization.
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